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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: This paper examines a number of US chemical industry incidents and their effect on 
equity prices of the incident company. Furthermore, this paper then examines the contagion 
effect of this incident on direct competitors. 
Findings: This paper finds that the incident company experiences deeper negative abnormal 
returns as the number of injuries and fatalities as a result of the incident increases. The equity 
value of the competitor companies suffer substantial losses stemming from contagion effects 
when disasters occur causing ten or more injuries and fatalities, but benefit from the incident 
through increasing equity value when the level of injury and fatality is minor.  
Practical implications: This research can be used as a resource to promote and justify the cost of 
safety mechanisms within the chemical industry, as incidents have been shown to negatively 
affect the equity value of the not just the incident company, but also their direct competitors.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper examines the influence a chemical related industrial incident has on the post-
incident valuation of the company that experienced the incident, and whether the degree of 
influence on its direct competitors is closely related to the severity of the incident as identified 
by the number of injuries and fatalities. When a company experiences a headline-grabbing 
incident, like a chemical accident, its stock price typically falls (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 
2010) due to anticipated costs of clean-up; lost business due to a non-operational plant; fines 
and penalties for environmental damage as well as potential lawsuits stemming from personal 
injuries and health concerns.  
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) examine stock market reaction to industrial disasters 
using multivariate analysis – showing that stock market losses for incident companies are 
significantly related to the seriousness of the investigated incident, as measured by the number 
of casualties and the presence of an environmental pollutant. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) 
and Rao (1996) also found that pollution incidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
associated with significant drops in stock returns. Event studies, signalling similar results, have 
also been carried out for the Exxon-Valdex oil spill of 1989 and the Bhopal explosion of 1984 
(Salinger, 1992; Herbst et al. 1996). Lee and Garza-Gomez (2012) investigated the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil spill of 2010 to find that stock market valuations indicated a $104.8 billion loss, but 
this recovered to a loss of $68.2 billion six months later when the well was permanently sealed. 
This was found to significantly outweigh the cost that BP allocated in its annual report of $40.9 
million1 (pre-tax). We can see clearly the substantial costs that are incurred from disasters of 
such a severe nature. To clarify the link between the transmission of news and the contagion 
effect, Kothari and Warner (2004) reported that more than 500 papers have been published in 
premium journals, showing that stock prices react as theoretically expected to news stories. 
This is a key idea in modern finance that stock prices react reasonably and promptly to news 
events.  
The effect of such an incident on competitors' stock price is less clear. On the one hand, 
competitors may benefit from any break in operations of the incident company since consumers 
will shift their purchases to other firms. However, if the incident raises concerns about health 
and safety regulations being inadequate, this could lead to recommendations and/or 
requirements imposed on all firms within the sector, thereby raising the cost of compliance for 
all the firms in the sector. In other words, the impact of the incident on the competitors will 
depend on whether the incident is viewed as being adverse only to the incident company or 
whether the incident raises concerns about the entire industry overall.  
Ho, Qui and Tang (2012) group these varying impacts on competitor firms’ stock prices into two 
categories: a contagion effect and a switch effect. Investigating the effects of airline crashes on 
equity market contagion, they propose that the direction of the impact of aviation disasters on 
the stock price of the crash airline’s rivals (competitors) depends on the interaction of the 
‘contagion’ effect and the ‘switch’ effect. This paper adopts a similar approach and denoting 
reactions to incidents chemical companies in the same manner. If the ‘switch’ effect dominates, 
a chemical incident in one company can present an opportunity to its main competitors when 
                                                          
1 This figure is taken from the 2010 BP Annual Income statement (BP plc ADS Annual Financials). In direct association with the 
incident, BP state: ‘The group income statement for 2010 includes a pre-tax charge of $40.9 billion in relation to the Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill. This comprises costs incurred up to 31 December 2010 and estimated obligations for future costs that can be estimated reliably at 
this time’. 
consumers ‘switch’ their consumption away from the product provided by the chemical incident 
company to the products provided by its competitors. These gains in sales and reputational 
benefits, all of which are valued by financial markets, are likely to bring about a stock price 
increase for the competitor firms while the stock price of the incident company is expected to 
fall. Alternatively, the ‘contagion’ effect arises when the news of a chemical disaster also 
influences the business of the non-incident competitors, if it provokes the general public’s 
concern towards their operating sector, or indeed has the potential to increase regulatory and 
future health and safety costs. This will have an adverse effect on the stock prices of the incident 
company and also on the stock prices of its main competitors    
This study relates the degree of severity of chemical related industrial disasters to post-event 
stock price reactions of the incident companies and their main competitors. The size of the 
incident is classified based on the number of injuries and fatalities. The size of the incident may 
affect not only how the incident company’s stock price is affected but also how the stock prices 
of its competitors behave. A small, localised incident may be more likely to result in a switch 
effect while a larger incident may generate a greater contagion effect due to greater adverse 
publicity towards the entire industry, leading to more calls for preventative measures and 
increased safety protocol. These measures may reduce stock valuations as they would be 
perceived as an increase in operating costs incurred by companies within the sector. 
2. Data and methodology 
The information on the U.S. industrial incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2013 was 
obtained from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) database2 and by completing a thorough 
search of the LexisNexis database3 using a comprehensive list of key words. To be included in 
the study, companies must also meet the following criteria. First, they must be U.S. based 
companies listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ at the time of the incident. Second, the company must 
have at least 200 pre-event daily prices available. Thirdly, only the incidents that have caused 
injury and death to employees are investigated. To avoid confounding effects, our analysis 
eliminates the incident companies with other significant corporate events within five days of 
the incident. Non-incident companies are identified as those most directly related to the 
incident company through the nature of their operating business purposes, sector and market 
capitalisation. The closest related companies are selected to compare with the incident 
company. The final sample includes 60 industrial incidents with 580 non-incident companies. 
Stock price/return information for the study period was then extracted from Bloomberg. 
Similar to Ho, Qiu and Tang (2012), the events were classified into three categories based on the 
degree of severity of the incident measured by the number of digits in the fatality figures. 
Inspired by the psychology literature, 10 and 100 were used as the cut-off fatality rates. Mitchell 
(2001) claims that the use of a decimal system suggests a natural tendency for people to think in 
terms of 10s and powers of 10, therefore grouping by the powers of 10 facilitates the mental 
ordering of the events and provides computationally convenient breaks between groups. Apart 
from reporting the actual numbers of deaths following an incident, the news media will often 
describe the seriousness of the event in terms of the number of digits of the injury and death 
                                                          
2
 The United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) website can be found at http://www.csb.gov/. The CSB acts as an independent 
federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. It is headquartered in Washington DC, and the agency’s 
board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
3 The Lexisnexis database can be found at https://www.lexisnexis.com. It provides the most expansive collection of online content, 
including media coverage, which was used to identify the key statistics based on the chemical incidents included in this research. 
toll. Therefore, we use 10 and 100 as the cut-off combined injury and fatality rate, which may 
reflect the psychological levels of the public’s perceived seriousness of the event. Our low injury 
and fatality group consists of disasters with single-digit numbers of injuries and fatalities and 
involves 47 chemical-events and 464 non-incident companies. The medium injury and fatality 
group includes the disasters that injured or killed between 10-99 people and affects 10 chemical 
companies and 98 non-incident companies. The high fatality group contains disasters with 
three-digit numbers of injuries and fatalities and involves two companies and 20 non-incident 
companies. The non-incident companies are selected as the most comparative competitive 
companies to the company that experienced the chemical industrial incident. This is ranked by 
the nature of the industry, the associated sector and by the size of the company as represented 
by the market capitalisation level. 
The stock market reaction to the incident is measured using event study methodology which is 
commonly employed in capital markets research. Event study methodology captures the 
abnormal returns (returns that cannot be explained by general market movements) and uses 
statistical tests to determine if the abnormal returns are statistically different from zero (Brown 
and Warner, 1980, 1985; Cowan, 1992). The date that the incident occurred is defined as the 
event day (day zero). If an incident occurred on a non-trading day or after market close on day 
zero, then the following day is used as day zero. The market model is estimated over the time 
interval from 230 to 30 trading days prior to the event. The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) for 
company i as of event day t is defined as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual stock return on the ith company on day t, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the 
S&P 500 stock market index on day t. ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 represent the regression constant and the 
coefficient of market returns for the 200 trading day market regression – providing evidence of 
the effects of short-term market dynamics for each company investigated. Non-trading days are 
excluded from the regressions. The coefficients are then used to regress the daily returns of the 
incident company at the time of the chemical incident to calculate results explicitly related to 
the event. The abnormal return (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) of a group of incident companies is calculated as: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
The cumulative average abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇1𝑇2) over an event window between days 𝑇1 and 
𝑇2 is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇1𝑇2 =
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
To test for significance within our estimates, we have selected the Patell-test and the SIGN test. 
As the cross-sectional t-test does not account for event-induced variance and thus overstates 
significance levels, Patell (1976) suggested to correct for this overstatement by first 
standardising each 𝐴𝑅𝑖 before calculating the test statistic using the standardised 𝐴𝑅𝑖. By 
cumulating these standardised abnormal returns over time, the test-statistic is defined as: 
𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙 =
1
√𝑁
∑
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖  represents the cumulative standardised 𝐴𝑅𝑖. The sign test was proposed by 
Cowen (1992) and builds on the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns 𝑃0
+ present in the 
event window. Under the null hypothesis, this ratio should not be significantly different from 
0.5. The test statistic is represented as: 
𝑡𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁 =
𝑝0
+ − 0.5
√0.5(1 − 0.5)
𝑁
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows that both incident and non-incident companies experience negative post-incident 
abnormal stock returns. A noticeable difference is that the stock prices of the non-incident 
companies reverse and tend to increase after the day of the incident, while the company that 
experienced the chemical incident causing injury and fatality tends to experience a significant 
increase in abnormal returns for 15 days. Panel A shows that incident companies tend to lose 
0.60% of their market value on the incident date and this loss is statistically significant. Panel B 
shows that the non-incident companies lose 0.33% of their market value on the crash date, but 
this reverts with gains of 0.23% and 0.51% on the following two days respectively. Figure 1 
demonstrates their cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the next 30-day post-event 
window.  
Table 1 
Post-chemical incident abnormal returns. 
 
Date AR Patell test Sign test Window CAR Patell test Sign test 
 
Panel A: Incident companies 
0 -0.60 3.53*** -2.10** (0,0) -0.60 -1.26 -2.77*** 
+1 -0.86 3.23*** -1.92* (0,1) -1.46 -1.09 -4.08*** 
+2 -0.08 2.60*** -1.15 (0,2) -1.54 2.05** -5.40*** 
+3 -0.16 2.55** -1.61 (0,3) -1.70 -3.01*** -3.27*** 
+4 0.11 1.18 -1.17 (0,4) -1.59 2.06** -1.59 
+5 -0.14 -1.43 -2.03** (0,5) -1.74 0.14 -2.08*** 
+10 -0.05 0.16 -2.44** (0,10) -1.61 -2.01** 2.22*** 
+15 0.13 1.25 -2.01** (0,15) -2.35 1.17 -1.56 
+20 0.13 1.07 -2.31** (0,20) -1.50 -1.43 -1.26 
+25 -0.19 -1.18 -4.98*** (0,25) -1.18 5.18*** -1.88*** 
+30 0.03 1.65* -3.66*** (0,30) -1.24 5.47*** -1.48 
 
Panel B: Non-incident companies 
0 -0.33 2.43*** -1.83* (0,0) -0.33 1.95* -1.83* 
+1 0.23 2.17** -2.38** (0,1) -0.10 -2.38** -2.31** 
+2 0.51 2.73*** 1.12 (0,2) 0.40 -5.52*** -2.66*** 
+3 -0.23 2.75*** -1.79* (0,3) 0.17 -2.99*** 1.49 
+4 -0.14 1.28 -1.81* (0,4) 0.03 -2.86*** 1.49 
+5 0.20 1.14 -0.94 (0,5) 0.24 2.44** 4.88*** 
+10 -0.11 1.90* -2.73*** (0,10) 1.54 3.16*** 4.65*** 
+15 0.33 0.72 -1.96** (0,15) 1.61 2.06** 6.08*** 
+20 0.31 2.61*** -1.21 (0,20) 2.17 1.02 1.56 
+25 0.15 3.36*** -5.83*** (0,25) 2.28 1.08 2.58*** 
+30 
 
0.03 2.54** -3.64*** (0,30) 2.28 2.07** 3.78*** 
AR is the average abnormal return and CAR stands for cumulative average abnormal return. Figures are reported in percentage rate 
terms. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Post-chemical incident CARs for all investigated companies 
Table 2 shows that the investors of the incident companies suffer larger losses on the incident 
date as the number of people injured or killed increases. As expected, the largest incidents are 
associated with the largest abnormal returns. The initial response to a comparatively small 
event is in line with that of a large event for the first day after the incident, but the abnormal 
returns of events with 1-9 injuries and fatalities reverts, though the CAR remains negative for 
30 days after. Larger events experience longer term negative ARs. Specifically, the average 
abnormal return of the incident company on the event date for single-digit disasters (panel A) is 
as low as -0.85% compared to -0.64% for the double-digit disasters (panel B) and -1.37% for 
the triple digit disasters (panel C). Over time, these abnormal returns tend to be more persistent 
when the event is more severe. After thirty days, the abnormal return for single-digit disasters 
is -3.10%, for double-digit disasters -4.01% and for triple-digit disasters -5.80% (with the most 
significant negative abnormal returns of -8.20% twenty days after the incident). Figure 2 
reveals the same findings with the largest injury and fatality incidents related to the largest 
negative abnormal returns. The negative abnormal returns for low and medium injury and 
fatality companies tend to disappear between 35 and 40 days after the incident, whereas the 
effects of large events last for between 40 and 45 days after the events.   
Table 2 
Abnormal returns of chemical incident company ranked by injury and fatality. 
Date AR Patell test Sign test Window CAR Patell test Sign test 
 
Panel A: Low injury and fatality companies 
0 -0.84 1.65* -1.87* (0,0) -0.84 -1.00 -1.87* 
+1 -1.07 1.14 -2.81*** (0,1) -1.90 1.41 -3.34*** 
+2 0.15 -2.74*** -3.57*** (0,2) -1.75 1.71* -0.73 
+3 0.35 1.60 -1.36 (0,3) -1.40 2.16** -1.91* 
+4 -0.05 2.23** -1.98** (0,4) -1.45 2.36** -1.10 
+5 0.20 2.73*** -3.62*** (0,5) -1.26 2.45** -1.46 
+10 0.18 1.38 -4.56*** (0,10) -0.96 3.16*** -2.36** 
+15 0.38 1.24 -4.79*** (0,15) -2.10 3.87*** -3.48*** 
+20 -0.40 2.24** -6.00*** (0,20) -3.40 2.47** -4.56*** 
+25 0.28 1.88* -2.55** (0,25) -3.42 3.17*** -3.55*** 
+30 0.15 1.44 1.11 (0,30) -3.10 1.80* -4.88*** 
 
Panel B: Medium injury and fatality companies 
0 -0.64 2.88*** -1.13 (0,0) -0.64 -1.42 -2.37** 
+1 -0.54 1.41 -1.47 (0,1) -1.18 1.75* -3.26*** 
+2 0.05 1.73* -0.89 (0,2) -1.13 1.73* -4.39*** 
+3 -0.16 1.31 -1.61 (0,3) -1.29 2.84*** -4.98*** 
+4 0.02 2.23** -1.35 (0,4) -1.26 2.82*** -6.04*** 
+5 -0.15 3.27*** -2.05* (0,5) -1.41 2.44** -5.91*** 
+10 -0.17 0.28 -3.00*** (0,10) -3.44 1.72* -1.76* 
+15 -0.24 1.45 -4.08*** (0,15) -3.78 3.97*** -2.34** 
+20 -0.10 4.47*** -3.79*** (0,20) -4.00 4.47*** -2.85*** 
+25 0.36 2.01** -1.02 (0,25) -4.00 4.12*** -3.81*** 
+30 -0.08 -1.46 -4.47*** (0,30) -4.01 3.55*** -3.49*** 
 
Panel C: High injury and fatality companies 
0 -1.37 2.02** -1.33 (0,0) -1.37 2.29** -3.39*** 
+1 -1.49 2.60*** -2.21** (0,1) -2.86 2.41** -2.45** 
+2 -0.29 1.65* -0.70 (0,2) -3.15 2.71*** -4.65*** 
+3 -0.05 -1.07 -0.37 (0,3) -3.20 2.24** -1.34 
+4 -0.20 1.51 -1.56 (0,4) -3.40 2.64*** -3.12*** 
+5 -0.64 1.03 -1.96** (0,5) -4.04 2.82*** -1.64 
+10 -0.52 1.10 -1.43 (0,10) -4.73 3.16*** -1.65* 
+15 -0.37 0.72 -1.65* (0,15) -5.87 -2.11** -1.42 
+20 -0.45 2.37** -5.69*** (0,20) -8.20 -2.48** -2.46** 
+25 0.14 1.60 -1.54 (0,25) -7.40 -1.96** -2.77*** 
+30 
 
0.64 2.67*** -2.71*** (0,30) -5.80 -1.55 -2.86*** 
Incidents leading to less than 10 injuries and fatalities are included in low injuries and fatalities. Incidents that have caused between 
10 and 99 injuries and fatalities are included in the medium injuries and fatalities. The high injuries and fatalities panel includes all 
incidents that caused the injury or death of over 100 people. AR is the average abnormal return and CAR stands for cumulative 
average abnormal return. Figures are reported in percentage rate terms. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Degree of injury and fatality and cumulative abnormal returns for incident companies  
 
Table 3 
Abnormal returns of non-chemical incident competitor company ranked by injury and fatality. 
Date AR Patell test Sign test Window CAR Patell test Sign test 
 
Panel A: Low injury and fatality companies 
0 0.05 3.16*** -1.67* (0,0) 0.05 -1.72* -1.67* 
+1 -0.02 2.56** 0.71 (0,1) 0.04 -3.44*** -1.56 
+2 0.10 -0.68 -1.75* (0,2) 0.14 -1.86* -1.50 
+3 -0.01 -1.00 -1.49 (0,3) 0.12 -1.23 -2.11** 
+4 0.00 -2.48** -1.67* (0,4) 0.13 -0.97 -2.67*** 
+5 0.00 0.56 -3.00*** (0,5) 0.12 2.44** -3.16*** 
+10 -0.17 2.76*** -2.93*** (0,10) 0.33 3.16*** -0.80 
+15 0.06 -0.87 -3.11*** (0,15) 0.41 3.87*** 1.06 
+20 0.05 -1.06 -3.52*** (0,20) 0.70 2.36** -2.62*** 
+25 0.07 0.33 -4.87*** (0,25) 0.94 5.64*** -3.87*** 
+30 -0.08 0.94 -2.72*** (0,30) 0.82 1.49 -4.29*** 
 
Panel B: Medium injury and fatality companies 
0 -0.42 2.53** -1.92* (0,0) -0.42 -1.81* -0.92 
+1 -0.38 1.89* -1.25 (0,1) -0.80 1.41 -1.84* 
+2 -0.86 2.11** -2.73*** (0,2) -1.66 1.73* -4.32*** 
+3 0.13 1.17 -0.91 (0,3) -1.54 1.08 -4.99*** 
+4 -0.23 1.42 -2.06** (0,4) -1.76 -1.04 -6.39*** 
+5 0.31 1.97** -1.55 (0,5) -1.45 1.24 -6.16*** 
+10 -0.07 3.16*** -2.54** (0,10) -2.74 2.40** -1.45 
+15 0.09 1.04 -2.25** (0,15) -1.30 -1.07 1.82* 
+20 0.07 0.95 -2.70*** (0,20) -0.92 -2.99*** -1.89* 
+25 0.31 5.63*** -1.38 (0,25) -1.90 5.84*** -1.69* 
+30 0.20 5.47*** -2.32** (0,30) -1.20 -1.11 -1.31 
 
Panel C: High injury and fatality companies 
0 -1.92 3.82*** -0.54 (0,0) -1.92 -3.88 -0.65 
+1 -0.43 1.77* -0.73 (0,1) -2.35 -6.17 -0.45 
+2 0.35 2.79*** -1.25 (0,2) -2.00 -6.19 -1.20 
+3 -0.11 -1.36 -2.98*** (0,3) -2.11 -4.80 -1.05 
+4 -0.09 1.42 -2.54** (0,4) -2.20 -3.23 -1.91 
+5 -0.05 0.71 -2.44** (0,5) -2.25 -1.65 1.15 
+10 0.12 2.54** -2.71*** (0,10) -3.04 3.16 -0.76 
+15 -0.09 2.12** -2.41** (0,15) -3.19 3.87 -1.49 
+20 -0.41 1.43 -2.86*** (0,20) -4.39 4.47 1.26 
+25 -0.06 1.91* -3.01*** (0,25) -4.94 5.30 3.11 
+30 
 
0.14 3.66*** -4.46*** (0,30) -5.05 3.22 2.47 
Incidents leading to less than 10 injuries and fatalities are included in low injuries and fatalities. Incidents that have caused between 
10 and 99 injuries and fatalities are included in the medium injuries and fatalities. The high injuries and fatalities panel includes all 
incidents that caused the injury or death of over 100 people. AR is the average abnormal return and CAR stands for cumulative 
average abnormal return. Figures are reported in percentage rate terms. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Degree of injury and fatality and cumulative abnormal returns for non-incident companies  
Figure 3 shows that the direction of the impact of chemical disasters on the stock prices of non-
incident companies is determined by the relative importance of the ‘switch’ effect and the 
‘contagion’ effect. These companies were selected as those most directly related to the incident 
company in terms of sector, business type and size (market capitalisation). It is expected that 
the ‘switch’ effect dominates the ‘contagion’ effect when the fatality figure is minor while the 
‘contagion’ effect begins to dominate the ‘switch’ effect as injuries and fatalities increase. In the 
first scenario, competing companies may benefit from the incident company's misfortune, 
potentially obtaining new business, increased sales and perhaps enhanced reputation. But with 
larger incidents, this scenario may change as incidents of this size and nature may be met with 
increased regulation, increased safety standards and associated costs and detrimental 
reputational effects. In this scenario, increased regulation and a focus on health and safety may 
be seen as a significant increase in company costs; therefore, leading to a contagion impact on 
the non-incident company’s equity value.  
Table 3 presents the test of this hypothesis. Panel A shows that both the ARs and CARs for the 
low-injury and fatality chemical incidents are consistently positive, suggesting that investors 
perceive that a small incident with a low injury and fatality toll may benefit the non-incident 
company due to the benefits described. On the contrary, as the number of people injured and 
killed exceeds 10, investors begin to adjust their valuations of the non-incident competitive 
companies. The consistently negative CARs of the non-incident companies reported in panels B 
and C above clearly provide supportive evidence for the argument that the ‘contagion’ effect 
prevails in large-scale disasters.  
 
Conclusion 
The stock market performance of companies who have experienced chemical related industrial 
incidents causing different levels of injuries and fatalities was examined. The results show that 
investors perceive differently the degree of severity with which these incidents influence the 
stock prices of the incident company and its main competitors. The incident company suffers 
larger losses in equity value than their competitors when the chemical incident occurs. When 
less than 10 injuries and fatalities occur, the non-incident competitors share price increases 
after an initial fall, lasting for two days, after the event. One explanation is that competitor 
profits may increase substantially from increased sales and the absence of legal cost and 
reputational damage, thus offering more feasible alternative exposure to the sector for 
investors. 
At higher levels of injury and fatality, denoting more serious chemical incidents, the stock prices 
of competitor companies are found to contain significant ARs, indicating a strong presence of 
contagion effects within the sector. In this situation, investors may perceive long term sectoral 
reputational damage stemming from the incident, combined with reduced company profits 
stemming from costs associated with an increased focus on the legislation and the creation and 
implementation of more stringent health and safety measures in the period after the incident.  
At a time when cost cutting measures are being implemented to increase the probability of 
company survival through financial crisis, it can become difficult to justify greater expense on 
health and safety and risk mitigation measures. However, this paper shows that the cost of the 
incident is not exclusive to lawsuits and compensation claims, but must also include the deep 
equity market damage associated. The incident does not only have to be within the incident 
company, as contagion effects from health and safety negligence by direct competitors can also 
have deep negative effects on the non-incident company’s finances. Therefore, there is a 
collective need for increased focus on health and safety and risk management across the entire 
chemical industry rather than pressures on individual firms to meet standards.  
In terms of regulation, when complemented by government penalties, the findings in this paper 
present evidence that financial markets are self-regulating when chemical disasters occur. 
Prices adjust for the severity of the incident, not just for the company responsible for the 
incident, but for their main competitors within the sector.  
Some incidents may well have wider implications for other industries and society in general and 
this needs to be investigated further. Moreover, other firm-specific characteristics as well as 
prior history of similar incidents may influence how the investors react – prices for companies 
with a history of such incidents may already reflect the expectation of such incidents in the 
stock price so that the investors will react only if the incident is strikingly different from 
previous incidents in size or scope. Again, this is something that needs to be investigated further 
in order to enhance our understanding of the implications of such incidents on the pricing of 
such risk. 
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